Jargon alert : externality by Aaron Steelman
I
magine you have high blood pressure and seek a doctor’s
advice. There are different things that he might prescribe:
He might put you on medication, or he might say that
the problem can be handled through exercise and diet. Both
solutions could have side effects, some negative and some
positive. The medication, for example, could cause you to
feel light-headed. The changed diet and exercise regime, on
the other hand, could help you lose weight and increase your
energy level.
Many types of economic activity also have side effects.
In some ways, these side effects are like those of the medical
patient mentioned above: They can be either negative or
positive. But in other ways, they are
different: They are felt not just by
the patient but by a larger group of
people. Economists refer to these
side effects as “externalities.”
Consider the case of a factory
that pollutes the air of neighboring
property owners. Those people are
not engaged in the manufacturing
process but they feel its effects.
They, not the owner of the factory
or the consumer of its goods, bear
the cost. This is an example of a
negative externality.
Now consider the case of a pos-
itive externality. Let’s say that you
enjoy gardening and plant a variety
of flowers in your yard. You benefit
from the beauty of those plants,
but so do your neighbors who can view them at no charge.
In both cases, government action may seem desirable.
One of the most common approaches is regulation. In the
case of the factory, the government might put a cap on the
amount of pollutants it can discharge. In the case of the
homeowner, the government might require all citizens to
meet minimum requirements regarding the upkeep of their
property. 
The government might decide to forego regulation,
however, and impose taxes instead. It could tax the factory
according to the amount of pollution it produces. That may
induce the factory to cut emissions on its own, but if not,
the government could use the tax proceeds to compensate
those affected by the smoke. In the case of the homeowner,
the government could subsidize improvements people make
to their houses and lawns.
Both of these solutions—regulation and taxation—can
be blunt instruments, though, and can produce side effects
of their own. It may be more desirable for the market to
work out these problems on its own. But how? In a 1960
article in the Journal of Law & Economics, Ronald Coase
argued that such externalities can be “internalized” as long
as property rights are fully allocated and transferable, and
transaction costs are low. 
Consider the case of the factory. Assume that the factory’s
emissions cause damages of $100 per year, that a smoke-pre-
venting device could be installed for $90 per year, and that
the government taxes the factory to cover the damages. In
this scenario, the smoke-preventing device would be installed
and the factory owner would be better off by $10 annually
than if he had paid the tax. “Yet the
position achieved may not be
optimal,” Coase writes. “Suppose
that those who suffer the damage
could avoid it by moving to other
locations or by taking various pre-
cautions which would cost them,
or be equivalent to a loss in income
of, $40 per annum. Then there
would be a gain in the value of pro-
duction of $50 if the factory con-
tinued to emit its smoke and those
now in the district moved else-
where or made other adjustments
to avoid the damage.” 
Under a robust system of prop-
erty rights, the parties would have
a strong incentive to negotiate and
arrive at this more efficient solu-
tion. For instance, the factory owner might simply buy the
homeowners’ right to clean air—at a cost between $40 and
$90 annually—and continue operating his plant as he had
before.
Naturally, some economists were skeptical of Coase’s
theorem and pointed to cases where they thought it would
not apply. Yet in many of those cases, voluntary, mutually
beneficial arrangements had long been the norm. The most
famous example involves bees.
Bees require nectar from plants, and plants require pol-
lination. So when plants were producing nectar and did not
need pollination, beekeepers paid farmers for the right to
put their hives on farmers’ fields. And when plants were pro-
ducing little nectar but needed pollination, farmers paid bee-
keepers. There was no regulation, tax, or subsidy involved. 
This does not mean that the market can handle all exter-
nalities. But Coase’s theorem should give us pause about the
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